Introduction
There is growing evidence in the economics literature of signicant and persistent productivity dierences between rms. For instance, in U.S. manufacturing a plant in the 90th percentile of productivity can produce twice as much as a plant in the 10th percentile using the same amount of inputs (Syverson [2004] ). Hsieh and Klenow [2009] nd even higher dierences in China and India. These dierences have also been noted by strategic management scholars. Firm level eects are larger than industry level eects and are a signicant determinant of rm performance.
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However, while both areas agree on the empirical evidence, they have dierent approaches to understanding the underlying mechanism behind the performance dierences. Recent work in economics has focused on dierences in management practices as a source of these persistent dierences (Gibbons et al. [2012] , Van Reenen [2010, 2007] ). Strategic management scholars have identied specic mechanisms, such as dynamic capabilities, 1 Evidence includes Hansen and Wernerfelt [1989] , McGahan and Porter [1997] , and McGahan [1999] which nd rm eects to be larger than industry level eects. Furthermore McGahan and Porter [1997] , and McGahan [1999] quantify rm eects as approximately twice as large as industry level eects.
often knowledge-based, that give rise to these persistent dierences (Teece et al. [1997] , Grant [1996] and Kogut and Zander [1996] ). Although many dierent denitions of dynamic capabilities exist, in this chapter we focus on those that t with the organizing quote (above) by Teece. These capabilities are based on dierences in three types of managerial activities: identifying new opportunities (sensing), mobilizing current resources to take advantage of new opportunities (seizing); and continually transforming the rm, its products and processes (transforming) . In this chapter we begin to bridge the gap between the economics and management literatures by describing these three forms of dynamic capabilities in an economic model. The goal of this agenda is to bring the ideas of dynamic capabilities to the economics literature concerning management practices and sharpen the predictions of the theory from the management literature, in order to inuence future empirical work.
Our analysis is based on the idea that dynamic capabilities are related to innovation. We therefore model dynamic capabilities as manifesting themselves in the ecacy of the rm's ability to innovate by allowing rms to choose the probability of successful innovation. We modify a basic model of investing to develop new products to accommodate examples of all three types of managerial activities described above. The formal model helps to clarify the sources and eects of these capabilities.
The rst application, sensing, shows how information can generate competitive advantage in innovation, providing a microfoundation for dynamic capabilities. In order to model sensing, rms dier in how much they know about important characteristics of the new opportunities around them. We show how information about these opportunities generates a dynamic capability described in the model. Whether or not this shows up more in terms of prots or in realized innovation rates depends on details of what the rm is sensing and how it responds to the information. The model points to one clear measure, return on investment, that is always linked to the capability.
The next two applications take the source of the capability as a cost advantage in innovative activity. We rst consider seizing which is ability of a rm to simultaneously exploit current opportunities and explore new ones. This is also known in the management literature as ambidexterity.
March's seminal work (March [1991] ) noted that because of the dierence in time frames between exploration and exploitation, namely that exploitation provides an almost certain, immediate return, while exploration entails an uncertain future return, it is dicult to balance these two activities. Others have noted that the resource requirements and incentives needed for both activities are quite dierent and further that this dynamic capability requires the use of structural ambidexterity, or the ability to simultaneously exploit and explore O'Reilly and Tushman [2008a] .
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Our model incorporates this notion that innovative activity comes at the expense of current prots, so that there is a trade-o between exploitation of past innovations and development of new ones. More ambidextrous organizations can do so with less foregone protability from exploiting past innovations. However, since ambidextrous organizations choose to invest more in innovative activities, they therefore may be less protable on existing lines of business, because the use of their dynamic capability masks its existence in measured protability. We also show how this model naturally leads to overtaking, where performance dierences may erode precisely because of the form of the dynamic capability, as rms with more to exploit may have more to lose. The eect captured by our model aligns well with observations from certain industries: for instance, in the photo-lithographic alignment equipment industry, Henderson and Clark [1990] argue that employee focus on improving the current generation led incumbent rms to disregard the threat posed by the next generation of products.
The nal application we model, transformation, captures the idea that existing experiences of the rm, to the extent that they can be transformed, are a source of cost advantages for innovative activities. In other words, incumbents in current leading designs may get an extra return: the potential to transform their current abilities into new ones, making them more able to become leaders in new, often related products. This raises the return from incumbency and unambiguously increases the amount of eort expended by non-incumbents who do not yet have the ability to transform, but seek to attain it. As we show in a simple two-period model, this can lead to interesting patterns of innovation: even though the incumbents have a comparative advantage (thanks to the dynamic capability) in innovation, it can be that new entrants actually invest more because they have the additional incentive to do so. Which eect dominates, depends on the expected future returns from obtaining the dynamic capability, but also on whether it creates cost advantage in terms of marginal or xed costs. Therefore, lack of investment in innovativeness on the incumbents' part does not mean that the dynamic 2 This occurs by the internal alignment of values, incentives and cultures in O'Reilly and Tushman [2008a] capabilities are not based on the ability to continually transform. Extending this logic to other forms of dynamic capabilities suggests that in a dynamic industry it may be hard to measure the strength of dynamic capabilities by comparing investment in innovation of dierent rms (for example, incumbents vs. new entrants). The reason is that even though rms without dynamic capabilities may have lower immediate returns from innovation, they are additionally motivated by the hope to acquire dynamic capabilities and that incents them to invest more.
Our modeling approach focuses on the external-to-the-rm eects of dynamic capabilities and not specically how internal organization facilitates them. Internal organizational design is an important aspect of dynamic capabilities 3 that would also benet from development of economics models. Using organization economics to further understand dynamic capabilities would further dialog between the two elds, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
The organization economics literature provides a variety of ways in which organizational dierences might lead to cost advantages, including Alchian and Demsetz [1972] .
Each of these applications stems from the same economic model of costs and benets of innovation. We describe that general setup in section 2. Then, in section 3, we introduce the three applications that use the general setup to derive results about the manifestation of dynamic capabilities implied by the model. The model highlights that dynamic capabilities may manifest themselves in dierent ways in terms of prots, return on investment, and innovation levels in dierent cases, and shows how the model can help to understand how dierent capabilities might have dierent measurable impacts.
At the conclusion of that section we describe how heterogeneity in dynamic capabilities among incumbents might be modeled, so that some incumbents have the dynamic capability, and others do not.
The Innovation Technology and Dynamic Capabilities Dynamic capabilities have been dened as "the rm's ability to integrate, build, and recongure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments" (Teece et al. [1997] 
Model of Stochastic Innovation
In our model rms invest in order to achieve an innovation that allows production of a new product. The results of investment are stochastic; two rms which make the same investments may have dierent outcomes. A key element of the model is the cost function for attempting to innovate: the more resources a rm commits to innovation, the more likely it is to succeed. We assume that the cost of having a probability of success in innovation, q, is
This form includes several important features. Innovation is never assured, as lim q→1 c(q) is innite. Innovation has a xed cost component F . Firms can dier both in terms of the xed cost component F and the variable cost shifting θ.
4 One interpretation of success, since success will be associated with an opportunity to earn prots, is as speed of success: if only the rst (few) rms to develop a new product will be able to protably sell it, then here a successful innovation means one that is generated fast enough to be able to generate prots. Throughout the paper we use the word innovation synonymously with q for simplicity.
While the model does presume that higher spending is associated with greater success at a given rm, it does not require that higher spending is associated with greater success across rms. Steve Jobs is reported to have 4 Many results can be generalized to the case where c(q) = F + θv(q), where v(q) is a convex, increasing variable cost component on [0, 1] .
said Innovation has nothing to do with how many R&D dollars you have.
When Apple came up with the Mac, IBM was spending at least one hundred times more on R&D. It's about. . . how much you get it. (Kirkpatrick [1998] ). If a rm (like IBM) has relatively higher θ than another rm (like Apple), higher spending for the same success rate q is consistent with the model. The model does, however, assume that it isn't low spending per se that makes a rm successful. At the margin at least, rms have something productive to do with R&D dollars, although at possibly very dierent rates across rms.
The present discounted value of prots from successfully innovating and producing a new product is π. To maximize expected prots from investment in innovation, the rm solves max q {πq − c(q)}.
Expected prots are
Notice that in this static model, both F and θ, aect rm prots, whereas only θ, aects the rm's level of innovation, while F determines only whether the rm invests at all.
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Three applications: Dynamic Capabilities as Sensing, Seizing, and Transforming
In this section we build on the general framework to interpret the organizing quote from Teece. In the rst subsection, rms dier in their ability to determine the protability of dierent new products. We show how this ability to sense opportunities leads to dynamic capabilities of the sort described by the general framework. Then we study rm ambidexterity explicitly in order to incorporate the idea that rms have dierent abilities to prot from new opportunities due to cannibalization. In the nal subsection we consider the eect of dynamic capabilities that allow the rm to transform current resources in order to create and produce new products. When studying the eect of transformation, we extend the model to consider the impact of differences in these capabilities on dynamic industry evolution. Finally, it is important to note, that each case is a very narrow view of the three types of dynamic capabilities that Teece discusses.
Sensing: Dynamic Capabilities and Information
We dene sensing as a rm ability to identify better when an opportunity is a good one. While both economists and strategic management scholars have emphasized the importance of human capital in providing the rm with competitive advantage (Hu [1990] , Burt [2009], and Becker [2009] ), the literature in strategic management has focused on the underlying mechanism.
As noted in the strategic management literature, this requires that the rm has the ability to recognize both the market and the technological opportunities, as well as be able to mobilize the necessary resources (Teece [2007] , Helfat et al. [2007] , and Maritan [2001] ).
We model the sensing dynamic capability in a case where each rm has several independent opportunities to innovate, each opportunity with dierent values of π, θ and F , reecting the quality of the opportunity through dierences in the return to innovation and the cost of innovating. Firms may dier in their information about π, θ and F . For simplicity, in this section we discuss explicitly the case where either the rm knows each opportunity's characteristics perfectly, and therefore has dynamic capability of sensing opportunities, or must decide based on expectations E(π), E(θ) and E(F ) because it lacks the sensing dynamic capability. Moreover, we assume that π and θ are independent. The results extend directly if the distribution of θ and F for the rm without the dynamic capability is any mean preserving spread of the distribution for the rm with the dynamic capability. This implies that any informative signal generates dynamic capabilities of the sort described here. The results are not, by contrast, about rms that dier with regard to the mean of the distribution itself: the rms view the opportunities as equally likely to be good, on average, but simply have more or less precise signals about the quality of any given project.
For the rm without the dynamic capability, the choice of q is just based on the expected values. If the rm chooses to invest, it selects innovation
It invests so long as the expected return is positive:
The rm with specic knowledge of π, θ and F chooses (as in the bench-
, and earns expected prots in any opportunity it enters given by π − F − 2 √ πθ.
Prots and Return on Investment
First, suppose that the rm with the sensing dynamic capability (i.e., superior information) invests a positive amount for every possible information it possesses. Then the sensing dynamic capability results in strictly higher prots on average since:
The former is the average prots for the rm that chooses q = 1 − θ π given the knowledge of θ and π, while the latter is the prots for the rm without the dynamic capability of sensing, which chooses q = 1 −
E(θ) E(π)
. The source of the higher prots can be seen by separating the total prots into the costs of innovation, F − √ πθ, and the expected prots from the innovations, qπ = π − √ πθ. Information about θ and π lowers costs by allowing the rm to tailor their investment eorts to, in the case of sensing θ, the lowest cost opportunities, and in the case of sensing π, the ones with the highest reward.
If the rm with the ability to sense also chooses to not invest in some projects, its prots must be even higher than the payo if they invest in all projects, and therefore the conclusion that the sensing dynamic capability strictly raises prots is strengthened. These results imply that, for the rm with the sensing dynamic capability, the return on investment is higher than the rm without the dynamic capability. We turn next to innovation levels and see that the capability need not be associated with higher levels of innovation.
Sensing and Innovation Levels
Measuring innovation as a result of the sensing capability is more subtle than measuring prots. Again, we begin with the case where the rm with the sensing capability invests in all projects. Because θ and π enter in dierent ways in the innovation level, q, we consider these two cases separately assuming that the other factor is perfectly observable to all rms.
In case only rms with the sensing dynamic capability can observe θ, while all rms can observe π, the average amount of innovation by the knowledgeable rm is given by
The rm without the sensing dynamic capability chooses the same amount of innovation for all new products given by
Thus, the rm that can sense the cost of innovation across dierent new products will invest in a greater average amount of innovation than the rm without the dynamic capability. This can be seen by the following inequality:
Therefore, the rm with the dynamic capability of sensing θ is more innovative, on average, then the rm without this dynamic capability. If the rm with the dynamic capability can choose to not invest in some projects, the excluded projects are those with the highest θ (and therefore the lowest q).
This implies that per project the innovation level of the rm with the dynamic capability to sense θ is higher still. However, if one measures merely the number of innovations, a rm with the dynamic capability might not appear more innovative, since they refrain from spending when the level of θ does not justify the investment, while the rm without the capability still invests (and sometimes innovates) in those cases.
Somewhat surprisingly, in case where the sensing dynamic capability is the ability to better observe π, the relationship between the dynamic capability and total innovation is unambiguously negative. First consider the case where the rm has the dynamic capability to sense π. In this case, the rm will have an average amount of innovation given by:
The rm without the dynamic capability to sense π sets its innovation level to
for all projects since it can not observe π. Since q is concave in π, by Jensen's inequality we have:
.
If the rm with the ability to sense π also chooses not to invest in some projects, their total innovation levels will be lower still. We summarize our ndings as:
Proposition 1. Suppose all rms have the same costs and benets of innovation, but dier in their information about them at the time of making decisions about investment in innovation. In particular, rms with sensing capability observe realized (π, θ, F ) before investing, while rms without the sensing capability do not observe them and hence invest conditional on the average E(π), E(θ) and E(F ). Then under optimal investment policies: a) The rms with sensing dynamic capabilities have strictly higher prots than the rms without. b) If the rms dier only in their sensing of θ, then when both types of rms invest a positive amount to innovate a product, the expected innovation level of the rms with the sensing capability is higher. Yet, the rms with the sensing capability may invest in a smaller set of products c) If the rms dier only in their sensing of π, then a rm with the sensing capability invests on average less in innovation. The dierence is even higher when rms without the sensing capability invest in all projects while the rms with the sensing capability do not invest in low-prot-potential products.
The dynamic capabilities to sense θ and π result in fundamentally dierent behavior. While both show up in total expected prots and return on investment, a rm with the ability to sense π will not be more innovative overall, and a rm able to sense θ will only be certain to be more innovative per project undertaken, and not in terms of overall innovation. The robust prediction of the sensing example is that the dynamic capability shows up in return on investment even when it does not show up in innovation rates directly. This simple model suggests that there is a more nuanced view about how expenditure on innovation can help researchers to back out both the type of sensing dynamic capability managers have as well as to identify rms with the dynamic capability.
3.2
Seizing: Dynamic Capabilities and Ambidexterity
In this section we consider explicitly how a new project might impact the prots from existing businesses. This might be a trade-o between mobilizing assets for a new project, and using them to exploit an existing one. Firms capable of this trade o are often termed ambidextrous. Early work in the area of ambidexterity notes that rms needed to be able to shift resources towards new projects, in order to both innovate new products and exploit these innovations (Duncan [1976] ). Fundamental work by March [1991] highlights the importance of rms being able to both explore new products and markets, as well as exploit current products and markets given the rapidly changing economic environment. Further, O'Reilly and Tushman [2008a] argue that the rm must be able to do both simultaneously in order to be able to benet. A rm with the ability to simultaneously explore and exploit provides it with an enhanced ability to sustain higher than average performance in the face of rapidly changing markets (Franco et al. [2009] ). The model will also allow for the possibility that the seizing capability is not about a trade-o between new and old projects, but an enabling of new projects by old ones. We expand on that idea in the transforming model below.
In order to discuss concepts like ambidexterity, we introduce two generations of products, with prot levels π 1 and π 2 . The rm has two potential sources of prots: one from the product which it has already developed and marketed, which we denote π 1 , and the possible prots from a new product that the rm may gain through innovation, corresponding to π in the prior section, which we now denote π 2 .
The rm must determine how much to invest in the new product, which is denoted by q 2 . The idea of ambidexterity is that the cost of innovating comes, at least partially, through a lower ability to prot from existing lines of business. In other words, the rm's prots from existing activities now depend on the resources it devotes to the new market, which we denote by π 1 (q 2 ) and assume that the more the rm invests in the new product, the less prots it receives from its existing product: ∂π 1 /∂q 2 < 0. The magnitude of this partial derivative reects ambidexterity: the closer it is to zero, the less the rm loses in current prots from investing in innovative activity so that it is easier for the rm to simultaneously explore and exploit.
More generally, ∂π 1 /∂q 2 measures what we will term the seizing dynamic capability. The higher is the partial derivative, the more the rm earns in existing lines of business when it succeeds at new things. In the case where the partial derivative is positive, rather than a trade-o, existing lines of business and new ones have complementarities. The rst order condition for the rm's investment in a new product, q 2 , is now given by
The rm's ambidexterity (measured by ∂π 1 ∂q 2 ), or its level of complementarity, acts in a manner similar to a change in θ: higher levels of ambidexterity lead to higher q 2 .
The seizing capability also shows up in prots from the rst generation product, but when there is a trade-o between new and old lines of business, the measurement of the dynamic capability from protability is dicult.
Ambidextrous rms lose less current protability from a given level of innovativeness, but as a result choose higher q 2 . Therefore whether or not π 1 is higher or lower for a more ambidextrous organization is ambiguous. It is also not sucient to condition on innovative level q 2 and measure protability, since rms that dier in ambidexterity but choose the same q 2 must also dier in another characteristic (like θ), and therefore such conditional profitability dierences would not stem just from ambidexterity. is the eect on current prots for rms with the dynamic capability and ∂π 1 ∂q 2 for those without it. Moreover, suppose that the costs and second-market opportunities are the same for all rms. Then a) The rms with the dynamic capability invest more in the second generation, q DC 2 > q 2 . b) Even if for every investment level q 2 the rms with dynamic capabilities have a higher prot, π DC 1 (q 2 ) π 1 (q 2 ), under the optimal investment strategies, the rms with the dynamic capability may have lower prots from the rst-generation product.
To nish this subsection, we use this model to illustrate the relation between ambidexterity and the phenomenon of technological lock-in. At the same time, we illustrate that dynamic capabilities can be dicult to dene, let alone measure.
Suppose that rms dier only in terms of prots from the exploitation of past innovations (π 1 ) and prots are a(q 2 )π 1 , where a(q 2 ) is a decreasing function and common to all rms (that is, π 2 , θ, a(q 2 ), and F are the same for all rms, but π 1 dier). In this formulation innovating into a new product has disruption costs that are proportional to current prots. The reason could be that investment q 2 disrupts prots from the existing line and that disruption could be deterministic, so that prots go down for some time, or stochastic, so that with a positive probability the rm experiences a drop in prots. In either case, the expected reduction in rst-generation prots depends on how hard the rm works at innovation q 2 , as in Holmes et al. [2012] . Even if all rms have the same ambidextrous dynamic capability (i.e. the function a(q 2 ) is the same for all rms), rms with greater π 1 will be less innovative because they have more to lose from the disruption, and therefore will appear less ambidextrous, simply due to their greater protability. Formally this occurs
This version of the model has two takeaways. First, rms with lower operational capabilities at the rst generation (i.e. lower π 1 ) are more likely to innovate and therefore the model has the feature that overtaking is likely.
Second, one might think of the rm with lower operational capabilities as having more seizing ability, since their ∂π 1 ∂q 2 is closer to zero; however it does not have any particular capability except the fact that it has less to lose from lost focus on existing product lines, since those product lines are less valuable. More generally, having the ability to continue to exploit while simultaneously exploring can occur for many reasons, including (but not limited to) an explicit dynamic capability to seize.
3.3
Transforming: Experience-driven dynamic capabilities In this subsection we consider the third type of dynamic capability -the ability to transform or recongure current resources to innovate and produce new products. Extant empirical work has pointed to this dynamic capability providing a benet to rms with past experience in a related submarket. For instance, both Buenstorf and Klepper [2010] and Franco and Filson [2006] note that new submarkets are related to innovation at leading incumbents.
Further, King and Tucci [2002] nd that rms with higher sales in the previous generation of products are more likely to enter the next generation.
Finally, Scott Morton [1999] shows that rms with past experience in production, distribution and marketing in similar markets to new ones are more likely to enter the new markets. In keeping with this evidence from both strategy scholars and economists, we consider the possibility that the transforming dynamic capability may be due to experience in earlier generations.
Since the model is about prior experience, we continue to use two generations of products, with prot levels π 1 and π 2 . Now, some rms are incumbents in the rst generation of products and try to innovate to enter also in the second one, while some rms may choose only to enter the second generation.
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The idea of the transforming dynamic capability is captured by assuming that rms with successful generation 1 products have lower F and/or θ, denoted F and θ . One explanation for this is that past experience provides the rm with the ability to transform existing resources. In order to focus on the impact of transformation, we analyze this dynamic capability in isolation (assume that there are no sensing or seizing dynamic capabilities), but of course in practice these forms of dynamic capabilities are likely to co-exist.
If we take the prots of each generation as exogenously given, we can apply our analysis from Section 2 to obtain a prediction that the if the dynamic capability is marginal (lower θ), then the incumbent rms will invest more. If the cost advantage is in xed costs, the dynamic capability will not aect innovation intensity, but only prots and possibly whether any new entrants try to enter the second generation of products.
To take the analysis one step further, we next use the model to endogenize 6 As in the discussion of ambidexterity, prots from the second generation product are not explicitly discounted.
prots from the two generations of products and address the natural question: how would such dynamic capabilities impact industry evolution? The analysis is consistent with the innite horizon model introduced in Mitchell and Skrzypacz [2015] .
Industry Equilibrium with Incumbency Advantage
To discuss the industry evolution, and in particular entry of new rms, we now introduce the idea that the prots per producer of a generation of a product depend on the amount of the producers in that generation. In particular, let the present discounted value of prots from successfully innovating and producing a new product in generation t be π t (N t ), where N t is the measure of successful rms producing the product. We assume that π t (N t ) is decreasing due to competition, although it is sucient that it is merely decreasing for large enough N .
7 The way we interpret π t (N t ) is that N t rms sell dierentiated products and earn positive prots despite (oligopolistic) competition. We take N t to be a continuous variable, as in the case where rms are small, to avoid integer issues when we discuss equilibrium with free entry. We assume that the prots per generation of a product are the same for all rms, but that the incumbents in t = 1 generation have cost advantage in innovation to enter into the second generation, as discussed above.
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To describe equilibrium in the industry with free entry, we work backwards, rst focusing on the de novo entrant's problem. A new entrant will choose to innovate as long as the expected return from innovation in the second generation product is greater than the cost. Using our previous analysis, a de novo entrant will make prots if and only if
We assume that prots in the second generation are large enough that, even if all rst generation rms enter into the second generation market, some new entry in the second period would be required to keep entry in the 7 Prots π(N ) may be increasing for small N for example due to positive network benets between rms.
8 Although we analyze here an industry with only two-generations of goods, the logic can be extended to the innite horizon case, as in Mitchell and Skrzypacz [2015] . rst period from being attractive. This assumption ts the experience of new products, where even when prior experience benets rms entering in new submarkets, some de novo rms enter (Agarwal et al. [2004] , Helfat and Lieberman [2002] , Klepper [2002] ). Under this assumption, for the industry to be in equilibrium, the amount of rms selling second generation products, N 2 , must be large enough to so that expected prots per successful entrant are zero, i.e.,
Since π 2 (N ) is decreasing, equilibrium N 2 must be decreasing in both θ and F .
With second generation prots in hand, we can analyze investment decisions of the incumbent rms (those which entered in the rst generation)
. Their optimal choice is as in (1), thus an incumbent's optimal innovative eort is:
Recall that incumbent rms, by assumption have both lower F and θ denoted by F and θ (which are the source of their dynamic capability).
We turn to the rst-generation innovation and assume that at this point all rms are symmetric. The expected prots of a successful rst-generation incumbent, including prots on both generations of products, are given by
For a forward-looking rm, investment in the rst market generates expected prots given by
So the optimal investment is
For a rm entering in the initial period, the reward is Π. Since the rm has not yet acquired the dynamic capabilities, its marginal cost level is θ. The rm does, however, foresee the benets of dynamic capabilities in terms of the benet of higher Π. The expected prots from successful entry in the rst generation goods, Π, have to be high enough that on average expected prots of potential entrants are zero (free entry). The same is true for the prots of second generation goods for the de novo entrants in the second period.
As a result, N 1 is determined by free entry:
This means, that N 1 must be large enough that
We can now make several observations about this industry equilibrium.
First, as θ is reduced, i.e. dynamic capabilities captured by variable costs are improved, both q 1 and q 2 increase. On the other hand, the impact of dynamic capabilities via reduced F , which in turn improves Π, come only through higher q 1 . For example, suppose the dynamic capabilities accrue due to sharing of a common R&D resource between the rst and second generation of products, reducing F . Then, an outside observer measuring innovativeness of rms would notice that they manifest themselves in increased innovation in the early generations of the products, but less in the later ones. In other words, dynamic capabilities of incumbents would manifest themselves in investment before they actually acquire the dynamic capabilities, making the measurement dicult. Second, we can use this analysis to characterize how, driven by endogenous entry, prots from the rst generation relate to second generation prots, and how they are impacted by dynamic capabilities:
Proposition 3. Suppose there are dynamic capabilities, i.e. F ≤ F and θ ≤ θ, with strict inequality for at least one. Then in a free-entry industry equilibrium (a) π 1 < π 2 and (b) π 1 is increasing in both F and θ .
Proof. (a) Since the marginal entrants in both generations do not have the dynamic capabilities and we assumed the cost of innovation is the same for both generations for such rms, the de novo entrants choose the same investments in both periods and hence Π = π 2 (this can be also veried algebraically comparing (4) and (2)). Expected Prots from innovation for the incumbents in the second period are strictly positive (since they enjoy cost advantage over the zero-expected prot new entrants) and are equal
Since by (3) Π=π 1 + Z, the result follows from combining the two previous observations. (3) and solving, we get:
The claim then follows by inspection. Intuitively, prots in the rst generation are decreased because rms are willing to sacrice early prots to obtain dynamic capability. The less dynamic capability advantage incumbents receive, the less entry in the rst generation, and the reduced competition increases rst-generation prots.
Because incumbents benet from dynamic capabilities in period two, they must pay for that asset with lower rst-period prots. Moreover, the greater is the magnitude of the dynamic capability (i.e. the lower is F or θ ) the lower are rst-period prots. Therefore innovative incumbents in situations where dynamic capabilities are large, seem to rise from the ashes in the sense of being especially unprotable in their early stages and enjoying higher prots later.
Transforming dynamic capabilities, as measured by lower θ and F , may
show up in the data on the number of rms eventually competing in the industry. Intuitively, dynamic capabilities impact both the intensive margin (innovation per rm) and the extensive margin (number of rms innovating) in equilibrium, the latter because lower costs encourage more rms to participate. These eects all arise because equilibrium eects are considered. The single-rm view of dynamic capabilities is that, since they make innovation into new products easier to achieve, they increase innovation by incumbents. However, to the extent that those capabilities are generated from a well-dened set of prior activities, we have illustrated here another eect: they cause rms to compete to acquire the resource in the rst place.
In the most extreme case, where dynamic capabilities reduce only the xed costs of innovation, the only evidence of dynamic capabilities in the data on innovation would be the indirect eect on innovation by entrants hoping to acquire the dynamic capability.
In some situations, this equilibrium eect can lead to the incumbents investing even less than new entrants without the dynamic capability. For example, add a generation 0 product to our model and assume that rms that are successful in generation 0 would maintain their dynamic capability for generation 2, even if they skip generation 1. Then, if π 1 is suciently low, because of the aggressive entry of new rms hoping to acquire the dynamic capability that would help them be successful innovating generation 2 products, the incumbents in generation 0 products may optimally decide not invest at all in generation 1. Such optimal response would make them appear innovative only in response of competitive entry of generation 1 producers. If the dynamic capability from generation 0 can be lost with some probability, this eect can contribute to the explanation of lock-in and over-taking that we discussed above.
Heterogeneous Dynamic Capability to Transform
Two features of the transformation model are perhaps unsatisfying. First, for simplicity, all incumbents enjoyed the dynamic capability. Further, so far dynamic capabilities were associated with incumbency, which conforms to some data, but is certainly not the only source of dynamic capability. Both assumptions can be relaxed.
One might imagine that only some incumbents have the dynamic capability. Suppose instead of simply all incumbents having (θ , F ) and all entrants having (θ, F ), every incumbent rm drew a cost vector θ, F from a distribution G(θ, F ). Experience-based dynamic capabilities allow for G to lead to better costs on average, but not always. All of the results from the prior subsection section pertaining to rms who have the dynamic capability apply.
Non-incumbents could also be endowed with some dynamic capabilities, for instance by drawing from some alternative distribution on (θ, F ). Some entrants would therefore have the same advantage as an incumbent though the frequency might dier. The sensing capability described at length in section 3.1 is one which could equally well occur in entrants and incumbents.
Conclusions
This chapter shows that a simple economic model can be used to formalize some ideas of dynamic capabilities put forth in the strategic management literature. In doing so, the implications of dierent sorts of dynamic capabilities, and how they might arise in the data, are claried.
This chapter highlights three main types of dynamic capabilities: Sensing; seizing and transforming. The rst type is associated with higher prots regardless of the form that sensing takes. However, the eect on innovation is ambiguous and depends on what the rm can forecast better than competitors. For example, if the rm has superior ability to forecast the prots of a new product line, the rm will invest less on average in new products.
The second type of dynamic capability allows rms to explore new products at a lower cost to exploitation of its existing products. It is associated with higher investment in innovation, but the impact on protability of current products is harder to determine since it may increase or decrease current prots compared with a rm without this dynamic capability. The third type of dynamic capability is associated with higher investment in the rst generation product and lower prots from that product. Thus, rms are willing to invest in acquiring the dynamic capability for the future generation product.
Our work provides a number of avenues for future research. First, the model is built using a specic cost function. We believe that this can be In the case of ambidexterity, our model focuses on the case where the rm is perfectly aware of the value of the new product and the cost of innovation.
This leaves aside some of the issues that may lead to failures to transition to new markets or submarkets. There is a rich literature in strategic management that considers the interaction of environmental conditions on the value of ambidexterity including work on environmental uncertainty (Siggelkow and Rivkin [2005] ), markets with increased competition (Bierly and Daly [2007] ), asymmetric access to resources (Cao et al. [2009] )), asymmetries in rm sizes (Lin et al. [2007] ) as well as rm culture (Benner [2010] Helfat and Peteraf [2015] show how these constructs are related and how they aect rm performance. Integrating these capabilities into a single analysis in order to better understand the linkages between them is another avenue for future work.
Our work has important implications for empirical research. As Helfat et al. [2007] point out, there is a potential tautology in identifying dynamic capabilities purely through performance; they suggest a two-step process of identifying an intermediate outcome which can then be linked to rm performance outcomes. Our models show that the subtle interactions due to equilibrium outcomes can make the two-step process dicult. For example, Stadler et al. [2013] use lower costs or higher value of output as a proxy for dynamic capabilities. In our setting, in equilibrium, dynamic capabilities might not even lead to higher levels of these indices, and in fact may lead to identifying rms with a dynamic capability as having none. Further development of models of dynamic capabilities will further our ability to identify dynamic capabilities empirically.
Incorporating ideas from the dynamic capabilities literature in formal models will help to bridge the strategic management and economic literatures, allowing for these ideas to be further developed and explored. By starting this conversation, we hope to identify new avenues for research in both theoretical and empirical work. We are optimistic that this will benet both communities. 
